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Discussions of both historical events and Scripture frequently centered on the extent to which one Www bangs bros com believe the Free casual dating in whately ma 1093 of witnesses reporting on past occurrences. References to eye- and earwitnesses, hearsay, and credible witnesses were common. This language, of course, suggests the courtroom. Indeed, naturalists, theologians, and historians often employed courtroom imagery. Historians were thus frequently admonished to act as unbiased and impartial judges rather than as partisan advocates.

It was necessary to determine whether the event in question was knowable, whether the parties had sufficient means to obtain such knowledge, whether the relators were eye- or earwitnesses, and whether the occurrences "were publically acted and known. Although fabrications were possible, there was little reason, given the lack of conflicting accounts, to doubt the events reported in secular history or the "History of Holy Scripture. Locke's criteria for evaluating testimony—the number of witnesses, their integrity, their skill at presenting evidence and its agreement with the circumstances, and last, the presence or absence of contrary testimony—had obvious relevance to the law.

This approach also came to serve the needs of the English legal system. As we have seen, initially there had been no need to construct a rationale for the truth-finding capacities of juries. As the role of witnesses increased, the problem of the credibility of secondhand reports of facts which had become central to theologians, naturalists, and historians became central to legal theorists who borrowed conceptual elements from the new empirical philosophy. Concern for the credibility of witnesses in criminal trials can be traced from at least the early sixteenth century, although the distinction between legal and credible witnesses does not appear to be clear at that time.

The jury's "conscience" was to evaluate the evidence. By the early seventeenth century, Francis Bacon, who we should recall was England's lord chancellor and a noted legal reformer as well as its preeminent natural philosopher, made clear Free casual dating in whately ma 1093 "the supply of testimony and the discerning and credit of testimony" were left wholly to the "juries consciences and understandings. Hale indicates if the jury has just cause to disbelieve what a witness swears, they are not bound to give their verdict according to the evidence, or testimony of that witness.

And they may sometimes give credit to one witness, though opposed by more than one. And indeed it is one of the excellencies of. It was necessary to weigh the veracity of him that reports and relates. And hence it is, that which is reported by many Eye witnesses hath greater motives of credibility than that which is reported by light and inconsiderable witnesses; that which is reported by a person disinterested, than that which is reported by persons whose interest is to have the thing true or believed to be true.

The "satisfied conscience" standard became the first vessel into which were poured the new criteria for evaluating facts and testimony. Satisfied conscience gradually became synonymous with rational belief, that is, belief beyond reasonable doubt. The newer standards borrowed heavily from religious and philosophical foundations, particularly from notions of moral certainty, or the highest degree of probability. This is not to say that juries, particularly in capital cases, had not always required convincing proof, but rather that legal formulations concerning that conviction were increasingly stated in terms that were consistent with reigning epistemological formulations.

The first is "if you believe," the second, "if you are satisfied or not satisfied with the evidence. Edward Waterhouse's Fortescue Illustratus employs similar language. He indicated that the jury's verdict was, "as they think in their conscience the truth of the fact is," after hearing the evidence. They were thus to "determine what their conscience judge clearly proved concerning the Fact. The most common judicial directives to the jury included phrases like "if you believe" or "if you believe on the evidence,"[44] "if you believe what the witness swore,"[45] and "if the evidence is sufficient to satisfy your conscience.

According to Sir John Hawles, a well-known Whig lawyer, a juror could not become "fully satisfied in their conscience" until he had carefully considered the matter, as well as the course of life of the testifier and the "credit of the Evidence. Hawles also insisted that juries be "satisfied in their particular Understanding and Conscience" of the "Truth and Righteousness of. Seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century trials abound in references to "conscience," and writers on conscience often used the trope of "an inner tribunal. So we must look to what the English meant by "conscience," and that means looking to casuistry.

Casuistry had a long tradition extending back through the High Middle Ages. It all but vanished in England by the end of the seventeenth century, perhaps because of increasing expectations that the need to make moral judgments was to be transferred from clergymen to individuals. English casuistry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries rejected the doctrine of "casuistical probabilism" associated with the Jesuits, a doctrine that required only a single authority to justify a course of conduct. It also rejected purely emotional or intuitive moral outcomes.

Post-Reformation English discussions involved an analysis of rational moral choice or decision making based on a relatively comprehensive evaluation of the entire situation in which the decision maker found himself. What was being dealt with was "cases of conscience. The judgment of conscience thus could not involve deferring to the authority or the wishes of another person. The language of judgment and judging pervades the writing of cases of conscience. William Perkins's Discourse of Conscience and his later Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience were designed as practical guides in resolving moral dilemmas.

According to Perkins, the conscience that was given by God to man "to declare or put in execution his just judgement against sinners" was "part of the Understanding in all reasonable creatures," and its function was to judge the goodness or badness of things or actions done and to "accuse or excuse. The former was compared to a notary who recorded what was said and done, the latter to a judge who "holdeth the assize.

Perkins went caaual analogy: Although the recorded cases are not available for the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, rating seems likely that the satisfied conscience standard was commonplace prior to the Ccasual, when our evidence becomes better. It is important for us to emphasize that the dhately of conscience was a rational decision. The conscience gave judgment, and it proceeded by a kind of argumentation by means of a reasoning process that Perkins called a "practical syllogism. Taylor, like Perkins and Ames, repeatedly insisted that conscience is a function of the understanding, not the passions. To go wjately conscience is to go against reason.

10093 Taylor's discussion of conscience predictably asserts that if moral things whahely not capable of mathematical or demonstrative certainty, they might nevertheless be "very highly cxsual. The overly doubtful conscience which substituted excessive suspicion for care would never find itself at rest. Conscience whateyl to be whaely with reasonable doubtsbut it was not to i excessively doubtful. The similarity between the casuistical and Frde legal conception can also be seen in the formulations of Robert South, another Maa cleric. South, like Taylor, insisted that the mathematical certainty of demonstration was not necessary in order to be assured of the 11093 Free casual dating in whately ma 1093 one's conscience.

The language of conscience and casuistry, however, also played a prominent role dtaing the more epistemologically sophisticated thinking of John Datihg and Samuel Pufendorf. And it is in Fres context of these turn-of-the-century philosophers that one can see how the language of conscience and casuistry came to pervade the discourse of eighteenth-century daitng philosophy and natural law. Its original moorings in moral theology were whateely eroded and obscured as it reemerged in the discourse of philosophers mz in the epistemologically oriented treatise writers of the law of evidence that developed from the mid-eighteenth century. Locke, whose Essay Concerning Human Understanding whatelyy prove so important to that treatise tradition, wrote about conscience primarily in the context of natural law.

Locke defined conscience as "nothing but an opinion of the truth of any practical position which whatelu concern any actions as well moral as religious, civil as ecclesiastical. Moral actions belong therefore to the jurisdiction of both the outward and caxual inward court, and cssual subjects to both dominations, of the civil as well as the domestic governor; I mean both of the magistrate and of conscience. The connection between the emerging "satisfied conscience" standard of the English courtroom and ka of the individual Christian conscience may be more complex than we have been able to trace here. The terminology whatelj casuistry and moral theology also pervaded Samuel Pufendorf's Of the Law of Nature and Nationswhich came to have a substantial following in England.

This Frer too helps us chart jn transition from casuistry to moral No login sex chat rightnow legal philosophy. Pufendorf begins with a discussion of "moral entities" and m "certainty of moral science. For Pufendorf the rightly informed conscience was of two sorts, persuasion whatrly on certain principles or persuasion which is "true datung certain; and sees no Frde to doubt it. The concept of certainty beyond reasonable whatelly is thus implicit in his argument from daging. Pufendorf argued for the "certainty of Moral sciences" and denied that they could "rise no higher than a probable Opinion.

Increasingly, discussions of conscience, casuistry, hwately theology, and natural law were in terms of moral certainty. Moral discussions, like religious belief, scientific findings, and historical evaluation, required a reasoned assessment based on the most complete information and evidence available. The "satisfied conscience" of the juryman in the courtroom and of the individual in his closet required rational, unbiased, and unemotional acts of the understanding. Before the late seventeenth century very few criminal cases are well documented.

Few trial records were preserved and even fewer printed. The decades of the Restoration mark a dramatic change at least insofar as criminal trials involving an important state interest are concerned. Beginning roughly with the spate of Popish Plot trials of —, public interest arose in questions of the credibility of witnesses and of the standards for conviction. Many dramatic trials, mostly treason trials, were printed—typically in pamphlet form. And it was in this no doubt somewhat inaccurate form that they eventually found their way into the collection of state trials, which still forms a mainstay of our knowledge of late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century criminal trials.

The political controversies of the — era, with their intensely legal overtones, were particularly important in bringing evidentiary issues to a public forum. The believability of witnesses and the decision rule for jurors were not solely of interest to the legal profession and to those accused of crimes during these heady decades. These issues may have been of no more interest to the greater part of the legal profession than to the general public, given that lawyers during this era played little or no role in criminal trials.

The standards of the satisfied conscience, moral certainty, and beyond reasonable doubt, which became characteristic of the late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English criminal courts, were thus derived from disciplines or areas of thought which had already developed or were attempting to develop rules and standards in matters of fact and everyday life. Judges, in an era of intense concern with issues of credibility, probability, and certainty in many other fields, not surprisingly turned to religious and intellectual traditions where these were well developed or developing. As we have seen, such traditions were employed by theologians engaged in polemics with Roman Catholics about scriptural authority, proofs for the Creation, and the relation of such authority to the proofs of natural religion and the casuistical tradition.

The cases between and employ language similar to the language of those between andalthough the number of judicial instructions which link believing the witnesses and reaching a satisfied conscience now outnumber other formulations. The question of "doubt" in the mind of the jury was rarely raised explicitly by the late seventeenth-century judiciary. It was the "mind" or "judgment," rather than the "conscience," which was to reach conclusions on the evidence. The need to be "satisfied," however, did not decline. In several cases the terms "belief" and "satisfaction" were used synonymously.

A guilty verdict was appropriate if the jurors "believed," an acquittal if they were not "satisfied. Judges and legal counsel now began to concern themselves with doubts that legitimately might appear in the minds of jurors. The "if you believe the evidence" phraseology is often replaced by "if you think the evidence" terminology. One judge advised a jury to "exercise your judgments" on the evidence. Although terms like "mind," "understanding," and "judgment" have an obviously more secular tone than "belief" and "conscience," and are sometimes substituted for them, it is important not to make sweeping statements about secularization, for the more secular terms often appear with the more traditional ones.

Recall in this connection that Bacon, in the early part of the seventeenth century, already referred simultaneously to the jury's "understanding" as well as to its conscience, and that the High Court of Justice in indicated they were "fully satisfied in their judgement and conscience" of the king's guilt. We can, however, trace a growing concern for situations in which juries might have doubts about evidence and thus about their verdicts. Their minds might be "suspended in such a degree of that doubt" that they could not be "satisfied. Anthony Morano has suggested that the beyond reasonable doubt test was introduced by the prosecution, and that it actually was designed to provide less protection to the accused than the "any doubt" test, which did not require that doubts be reasonable.

I do not think that the "any doubt" terminology ever meant that juries should acquit on the basis of frivolous doubt. The term "moral certainty" was taken to mean proof beyond reasonable doubt. If one had real doubts, moral certainty was not reached. The term "beyond reasonable doubt" was, I believe, not a replacement for the any doubt test but was added to clarify the notions of moral certainty and satisfied belief. Indeed, many of the cases that enunciate the beyond reasonable doubt test for acquittal employ the "if you believe," or "if your conscience is satisfied," or "if you are satisfied with the evidence" phraseology when stating what was required for conviction.

Reasonable doubt was simply a better explanation of the satisfied conscience standard that resulted from increasing familiarity with the moral certainty concept. It would obviously be in the interest of defendants to emphasize doubt. Anthony Morano's research, however, has established that the beyond reasonable doubt standard was employed in the Boston Massacre trials ofrather than first appearing in the turn-of-the-century Irish treason trials. The prosecution, appealing to the jury's "Cool and Candid Reason," indicated that if the "Evidence is not sufficient to Convince beyond reasonable Doubt," then the jury must acquit.

The prosecution, of course, asserted that the evidence was "sufficient to convince you of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Sir Geoffrey Gilbert's authoritative Law of Evidencewhich employs similar language, had appeared in several editions before Thus inin one of the rare cases fully recorded in shorthand tried at Old Bailey, Counsel Mansfield told the jury, "If the evidence be such as 'irresistibly proves' [the crime]. The jury was informed that if they had any reasonable doubt, then they must acquit, "for it is the invariable direction of our English Courts of Justice to lean on the side of mercy. Another judge indicated that a guilty verdict should be forthcoming "if your understandings are absolutely coerced to believe" the testimony of the witness.

Coerced assent was, as we have seen, equivalent to moral certainty and to Locke's highest degree of probability. If, however, the jury had "any rational doubt" in their "minds," they must acquit. A third judge combined the notions of conscience, belief, and rational doubt. The jury was "to determine upon the weight of. The same mixture appears in the Trial of Leary If the evidence "carries conviction to your minds. But if you should "entertain such a reasonable doubt," they must acquit. Jurors were expected to conform to the model of the rational man. In the Trial of Glennanthe judge said, "If you have a reasonable doubt, not such as the idle or fanciful may take upon remote probabilities, but such as cannot satisfy your judgement upon your oath," then the jury should acquit.

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The beyond reasonable doubt standard was prominent in all the turn-of-the-century Irish treason trials. Yet there was no indication that a new standard was self-consciously enunciated. The new formula usually appeared with statements that conviction rests on a satisfied conscience or belief in the testimony of the witnesses. I am not suggesting that juries had become more concerned with high levels of proof, for they seemed to have expected them, but rather that the judiciary, in its charges to the jury, were now articulating those high standards in language consistent with and influenced by the terminology of the established religious and philosophical communities.

The beyond reasonable doubt standard also appears in a number of U. The trial of Matthew Lyon for seditious libel in the Circuit Court for the Vermont District indicates that the standard was being applied early in the history of the new nation. The judge informed the jury, "you must be satisfied beyond all reasonable substantial doubt that hypothesis of innocence is unsustainable. Circuit Court, —, advised the jury to "remember that it is enough for us in defense of the prisoner to raise a doubt; for if you doubt it it is the principle of law, as well as of humanity you must acquit. It is not merely possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.

This we take to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The addition of the concept of moral certainty to legal language reflected the desire to make the language consistent with prevailing philosophical terminology. This terminology, however foreign sounding to modern ears, was part of the language and discourse of the educated classes in both England and America. Satisfied conscience, reasonable doubt, and moral certainty were widely used concepts, and these and related terms were found in moral, theological, historical, philosophical, and legal discourse. One of the most interesting features of treatises on evidence and the more general discussions of law is that so many authors found it necessary to treat legal evidence in the context of current epistemological thought.

It seemed to them essential to ground the rules of evidence, which were the bulk of the treatises, on what was considered to be a sound theory of knowledge. Legal rules, it was evidently felt, Free casual dating in whately ma 1093 not stand alone. Nor were they justified by tradition or a special sort of legal reasoning. The treatise writers attempted to demonstrate that the rules of evidence, some of them several centuries old, could and did rest on sound notions of what constituted appropriate evidence and good proofs—that is, on an intellectually satisfying theory of human knowledge.

The rules, then, were not directly derived from philosophical principles, but were seen as conforming to sound epistemological and logical principles. Several major Anglo-American writers attempted to integrate legal evidence with the reigning empirical English philosophies. The two earliest writers, Sir Geoffrey Gilbert and John Morgan, rely on Locke to provide the foundation for their treatises. Thus, if the earliest treatises are liberally sprinkled with Locke, the later ones include generous dashes of Hartley, Reid, Bentham, Paley, Stewart, Kirwan, Whately, and others. He was also the author of Abstract of Mr.

Locke's Essay on Human Understanding. Not surprisingly, his posthumously published treatise on evidence begins with a summary of Lockean principles: There are several degrees from perfect Certainty and Demonstration, quite down to Improbability and Unlikeness. Now what is to be done in all Trials of Right, is to range all Matters in the Scale of Probability, so as to lay most Weight where the Cause ought to preponderate, and thereby to make the most exact Discernment that can be, in Relation to the Right. Assessment of probability, however, required careful consideration of the degrees of credibility of the witnesses. There was no more reason to doubt the statements of credible witnesses than if "we ourselves had heard and seen" what the witnesses reported.

Verdicts, according to Gilbert, would necessarily be devoid Free casual dating in whately ma 1093 absolute certainty or demonstration, but trials, at least those with appropriately credible witnesses, might proceed to verdicts which the jury had no reason to doubt. Gilbert's Lockean formulation, as well as the evidence from the state trials cited earlier, suggests that the beyond reasonable doubt rule first applied only to direct testimony and was not initially applied to circumstantial evidence. These ranged from "full assurance and confidence, to conjecture, doubt and disbelief.

Morgan, like Gilbert, hoped to ground the law of evidence on a sound epistemological foundation. James Wilson, professor of law at the College of Philadelphia and associate justice of the U. Supreme Court, in insisted that the law was and must be "comformable to the true theory of the human mind. Such a position, they insisted, might be taken by a logician but had no meaning in ordinary speech or everyday life. Thus a good deal of the evidence derived from testimony, which for the traditional philosopher was "merely probable," was properly classified as "certainty" by the rest of mankind.

Thomas Reid thus insisted that the execution of Charles I was a certain fact—not a statement of probability. Human capacity for error, therefore, was irrelevant to consideration of whether one was correct or erroneous in particular cases. Common sense properly viewed well-attested facts as knowledge, not as mere opinion and probability. The Common Sense school was especially anxious to counter the skepticism of Hume, which insisted that no amount of evidence could remove doubt. Thus Dugald Stewart, like Reid, insisted that while it was always logically possible that judgments in matters of fact might be mistaken, there were some instances in which they were as certain as any euclidean truth.

It is, therefore, not surprising to find Hume absent from most writing on legal evidence. The former yielded abstract and necessary truths, or the unchangeable relations of ideas. The latter dealt with "real but contingent truths and connections which take place among things actually existing. It provided both the "greatest part" of the jury's business and the most knowledge of "men and things. The reputation of the witness and the manner in which testimony was delivered also entered into the jury's evaluation.

All these elements considered jointly would render the force of the testimony believable or not. The concurrent testimony of many witnesses deprived of the opportunity for collusion thus would be "equal to that of strict demonstration. The jury's belief thus required a considered "act of the mind. The language of moral certainty and beyond reasonable doubt and the provision of philosophically oriented statements concerning the nature of human knowledge were becoming commonplace in early nineteenth century evidence treatises, although not every text included both elements. If Leonard McNally's much-used Rules of Evidence on Pleas of the Crown offers little in the way of philosophical underpinnings, McNally nevertheless played a crucial role in enunciating and publicizing the beyond reasonable doubt standard—both as defense counsel in several of the Irish treason trials and in his treatise on evidence.

He insisted that it was a rule of law that if a jury "entertain[s] a reasonable doubt" as to the truth of the testimony of the witnesses, it must acquit. Reasonable doubt arose from testimony which the jury judged not to "deserve credit. Showing resentment or partiality, for example, might "impress suspicion" or prevarication. If the witness's credibility was questionable, "unless his testimony be supported by clear and collateral proof. He thus makes the now commonplace distinction between intuitive, or demonstrative, knowledge and probable knowledge, under which he includes both presumption, or indirect proofs, as well as direct proofs.

If demonstrative knowledge "exclude[s] all possible doubt," probable and presumptive knowledge did not. Degrees of certitude thus varied. For this reason, rules were needed "to restrain the latitude of individual opinion and conduct in the investigations of truth by a strict and methodical course of argument. Because most Anglo-American philosophy and epistemology were empirical in their orientation, a great deal of attention was quite naturally devoted to questions relating to the probability and certainty of arguments and evidence which related to matters of fact. We have already noted the early dependence on Locke. Let your buddies know that you are now searching for a casual relationship rather than a full blown relationship that is committed for the time being at least, and you'll be surprised that so many of them will be encouraging of your choice.

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